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12 CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
his life? Not on your life! He will pass him on to
another unit. (On blackboard, write: PRISONS)
And, if Giorgio's case is not too politically sensitive,
he will eventually be released on parole. Would one
of the rifle-toting guards from the tower help Giorgio
to find a job and settle back into society? Not for the
world! He will be handed on to another unit. (On
blackboard, write: PAROLE AND AFTER-CARE
SERVICES)
Now, let's all draw a new diagram in our exercise
books and later on you can colour It in:
bANCER TO 'IIE USFUL CITIZEN
COMMUNITY
Very good! Now, let's go back over our definition
of "SYSTEM":
First, it has an INPUT where the raw meat is fed in
... (Ignore any little smart-arse who asks If the meat is
really "raw" and starts quoting Prisons Division
statistics showing that well over two-thirds of their in-
coming material has already been processed through
the machine at least once.)
...TO A SERIES OF UNITS SEQUENTIALLY LINKED...
(Be careful not to be side-tracked by pupils saying
things like: "But, Miss, when my brother got fed into
the machine, the police first decided he was guilty
and punished him; then he was sentenced to a prison
called 'Remand Yard' and then, ten months later, he
got to the County Court and they sent him home...")
... WHICH ALL CONTRIBUTE TO ONE FINISHED
PRODUCT. (Hurry on before pupils begin discussing
the quality of the sausages and asking about
recidivism rates. Be especially alert to avoid red herr-
Ings like the concept of "recycled sausages".)
You see how smoothly a technological society
handles a problem like criminal deviance? And it is a
very big system. In Victoria, the "Grinder" costs a bit
over a hundred million dollars a year to run; the "Stuf-
fer" and the "Twister" are both parts of the Social
Welfare Department which costs another hundred-
odd million dollars a year; and nobody can work out
what the "Mixer" costs. But it does produce lots and
lots of sausages.
And if you study hard, clean your teeth three times
a day and do your homework, you too can become a
Systems Analyst and write learned articles for the
Legal Service Bulletin.
(Allow ten minutes' play-time and then move on to
"Nature Study".)
A POLITICAL APPROACH
Industrial health and safety
H.J. GLASBEEK
Nothing that we do to people in our society approx-
Imates the personal tragedy and victimization that is
Inflicted by bad working conditions upon people who
are in a very poor position to defend themselves •
workers'.
It is my view that although, in our various jurisdic-
tions, we are developing more means to safeguard
the worker against some of the worst excesses of in-
jury that may occur at the workplace, the tools
available to us are inherently deficient and will never
guarantee even remotely satisfactory conditions for
workers. I will briefly explain why this is so. The defi-
ciencies arise out of implied assumptions which, if
forced out in the open, wOuld reveal the inhumanity
of our socio-economic system. Such a revelation
might lead to a fundamentalist approach to change.
The lever I would like to use to reveal the genesis of
the slaughter which we coyly term the "problem of
safety and health in the workplace" is the application
of the criminal law. I want to stigmatize employers for
what they are: criminals.
As all employment situations inherently create
some risk, to eliminate all risk of injury, logically, one
ought to eliminate all enterprise. This is obviously an
unacceptable means of approaching the problem.
But it is put forward because it characterizes what'is
at issue: it is the fact of enterprise which creates the
risk. The focus of any scheme which hopes to better
conditions for workers has to be the nature of and
control over the enterprise.
TOOLS WHICH WE MIGHT USE TO IMPROVE
WORK CONDITIONS
(1) Many of the safety and health problems of
employees find their origin in the very decision to set
up the plant in a particular way. The location of a
plant, the design and structure of buildings, the
selection of equipment and machinery, the choice of
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particular materials for the processes of the plant,
the choice of what products are to be manufactured,
etc., all are decisions which vitally affect the working
conditions of the employees. It could therefore be
argued that no enterprise should ever be permitted
to start up unless it has met tests designed by
people who are partisanly interested In creating the
best possible conditions for workers in the enter-
prise.
(2) Another means of control is the use of
employers'lemployees' health and safety commit-
tees, endowed with real powers. These joint commit-
tees ought to have the right to inspect the premises
at all times, to make recommendations as to how to
improve conditions, to inquire into complaints made
by workers, and, if necessary, to close down the
operation of the plant until matters have improved to
the satisfaction of the committee.
(3) Unions should always bargain vigorously about
health and safety conditions. The bargaining should
include an insistence on a say in the introduction of
new machinery or new materials to the manufactur-
ing process, on the right to set up joint committees
as described above, and always include a demand
that costs of injuries should be borne by the
employer to a larger extent than existing workmen's
compensation schemes make him do.
(4) Statutory bodies could be set up to regulate
health and safety conditions in workplaces. These
would provide for standards of safety and health
regulation with an inspectorate system which has the
right to impose penalties and the right to stop opera-
tions until standards are met.
(5) From time-to-time it has been proposed that an
injury tax should be levied on employers. The notion
is that, every time a worker's Injury or disease is at-
tributable to work conditions, the employer is to pay
an appropriate penalty into a fund. The point of this is
that the employer would then be forced to focus on
the financial need for better conditions. The tax
would be collected by having the employer either
declare the injuries to a safety and health agency just
as he declares his income to the revenue authorities;
or he would be subject to having workmen's com-
pensation claims scrutinized and, from this scrutiny,
an appropriate injury tax could be worked out.
(6) Implicit in all of the above is a tool which must
always be used, namely, education of people to the
real hazards of working. This includes not only the
people who work, employers and employees, but
also unions as institutions, designers, engineers, ar-
chitects, chemists, doctors etc.
THE VARIOUS SCHEMES' DEFICIENCIES
Most of the above means are in use to some extent
in our various jurisdictions. They all fall far short of
providing the protection which I see as a basic
minimum.
Enterprise licensing: As it is impossible in our
society to even begin to suggest that there should be
no enterprise at all, we come down to the first of the
tools suggested, namely that a licensing system
should be introduced whereby no enterprise would
be started unless an appropriate body agrees that as
risk-free an environment as possible has been
created. The notion that permits should be granted to
enter into productive enterprise is, after all, not a Pholo: Olmar Thormann
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radical Idea. We have long recognized that certain
activities cannot be permitted to be self-regulatory.
Thus, we do not let medical practitioners, lawyers )r
dentists practise without permits; we do not let
build anywhere they like - we have zoning laws and
permits' systems governing such activities; we do
not permit anyone who wishes to set up a bank. The
notion has been accepted whenever it is clear that
large segments of the public would be adversely af-
fected by uncontrolled behaviour. Somehow or other
we have not yet felt the same urge to protect people
who are at work. There the requirement of conformi-
ty to prescribed standards is Imposed after the enter-
prise has been set up. The relationship between en-
trepreneur and the public is clearly viewed quite dif-
ferently from that between the entrepreneur and his
employees. The class bias of our system is thus em-
phasized. Because this bias is likely to persist, it is
unlikely that we will go to a system of permits before
enterprise can start up as a means of protecting
workers. Profitability at the expense of workers'
health Is the implied assumption to which no-one in
power would admit in public, but which Is the factor
which makes all of the tools presently used to pro-
tect workers deficient.
Trade union negotiation: To leave it to the bargain-
Ing ability of trade unions to protect workers also has
clear demerits. It requires a great knowledge of oc-
cupational health problems by the trade unions. That
knowledge does not yet exist. It will take a long time
to acquire it. More importantly, trade unions have
come to accept that the ownership of the modes of
production Is vested in- employers and that, fun-
damentally, it Is not the trade unions' role to wrest it
away from them. This means that trade unions
believe that their role is to improve the workers'
share of the productive enterprise, rather than to
change the relations of production. It is much easier
to quantify Improvement in terms of dollars than it is
in terms of quality of working conditions. To do the
latter, the trade unions, as institutions, must under-
stand not only the nature of occupational health
hazards, but must also educate their rank and file to
the same level of comprehension. Only then can the
unions sensibly make arguments that It Is more im-
portant to obtain safer working conditions than it is to
get more money in their wage packets.
Note that I am assuming that trade unions will see
safety and dollars as a trade-off. There Is no logical
necessity to make that assumption. But one of the
corollaries of not questioning the relations of produc-
tion has been that trade unions have come to accept
that the easiest way to Increase workers' income is
to take the same share of an increasing cake, rather
than make an attempt at cutting into the profit of the
employer. The latter means, after all, would be a step
in the direction of questioning the right to ownership.
The Ingrained belief that, in the long run, the share of
both workers and employers is pre-destined by
sacrosanct market principles, leads to the belief that
an improvement in working conditions at the im-
mediate expense of the employers will be an even-
tual expense to the worker.
Joint safety committees: Note further that when
trade unions bargain about health and safety condi-
tions, this bargaining does not come into play until
the plant has been set up. That is, major managerial
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decisions which will affect the health conditions of
workers have already been made and are very
unlikely to be the subject of bargaining again. Thus,
inasmuch as bargaining does take place, it cannot be
very effective. Further, as unions are not interested
In Imposing too much cost on employers, their
bargaining concentrates on obtaining the installation
of relatively costless safeguards. They will seek to
obt3in some system under which they will be allowed
to halt - as opposed to prevent - unsafe productive
processes. In order to do this, they must have
available to them Information about the actual cond-
itions of the plant and power to do something about
unacceptable conditions. Many schemes of this kind
have sprung up In North America. The most common
are joint employer/employee safety committees with
equal representation from both the employer and
employees. These vary in sophistication. Some are
merely allowed to inspect and report; others are ac-
tually to be given all the Information available and may
have power to make recommendations; others may
even have the power to order a halting of production
until conditions are remedied'. So far they have not
provided much Improvement because, at best, they
will come Into play when conditions clearly fall below
already-established standards. Where the evils are
unknown or if known not remediable without great
cost, the joint committees will not be in a position to
be militant.
In Canada there are legislative schemes which im-
pose joint committee systems3. Where they exist by
dint of legislation it will be Immediately apparent that
they are subject to the vagaries of the political pro-
cess. For instance, in Manitoba an extensive scheme
of employer/employee joint committees, backed by a
governmental Inspectorate and standard-setting
agency was set up but as soon as the government
changed from a social democrat one to a truly con-
servative one, the inspectorate was diminished in
number to such an extent, and the agency was given
so little to do, that the scheme, although still in place,
has been rendered totally impotent.
Regulatory agencies: The most noteworthy
development of recent time has been the creation of
statutory schemes of regulation4.Typically, they pro-
vide for the creation of an administrative agency
which sets what it determines to be appropriate safe-
ty and occupational health standards and then, by a
system of inspection, sets out to enforce the stan-
dards. There are models of varying sophistication.
They all have built-in weaknesses. In particular,
because diseases may have more than one cause, it
Is difficult to state with accuracy whether or not cer-
tain material environments will produce certain unac-
ceptable health consequences. For instance, there
are still arguments that there Is no conclusive link
between asbestosis and the use of asbestosi5 Fur-
ther, even where it is accepted that there is a fatal
link, it is always open to dispute as to how much ex-
posure to a particular material renders the environ-
ment unsafe. The difficulty In measurement arises
because there is frequently a time lag between the
exposure and the ensuing occupational disease. In-
evitably, therefore, when the statutory body does its
research in order to prescribe standards there is a
great deal of respectable scientific opinion which
varies tremendously in its recommendations. Part of
the difficulty, no doubt, stems from the fact that
Legal Service Bulletin
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researchers are bought and sold in very much the
same way as used cars are. But, even if the agency
has determined as a matter of scientific resolution
that certain standards ought to be met in the
workplace, this does not mean that that agency will
regulate those standards into effect. The agency is
created by the political process, and accepts its
ground rules. It therefore accepts the basic proposi-
tion that one must not inhibit enterprise unnecessari-
ly and, most importantly, that there must be a profit. It
will, inevitably, seek a compromised optimum stan-
dard for safety conditions. The compromise will be a
balance between the need to make a goodly profit
and the need to maintain a certain health standard.
This kind of balancing trick defies imagination, but
the courts have required the United States' Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act agency to do just that'.
In a similar vein, because they depend for their ap-
propriations on the political process, these agencies
in enforcing whatever regulations they finally put into
effect must keep an eye on the most effective lob-
byists in the country. Thus, a system of fines and the
right to closure will be sanctions whose use may well
depend upon which party is in powerf. Typically,
fines have been very low and inspectors have usually
been told to help people sort out health problems
rather than to enforce the statute.
An Injury Tax: Finally, the functional potential of the
injury tax scheme may be doubted. Because the
causal connection between a disease and the en-
vironment is not always easy to establish, it will be
hard to know when to impose an appropriate tax.
Secondly, the amount of the injury tax will be hard to
gauge. If the size of the penalties presently imposed
under regulations proscribing certain kinds of con-
duct are any indication, the likelihood of serious
amounts being levied by way of injury tax is not very
great Such a scheme might also have a backlash ef-
fect because people might be sacked if they are con-
sidered injury or disease-prone. There may be
discrimination in hiring. Also as workmen's compen-
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sation legislation has done from time to time, injury
tax schemes would provide an incentive to
employers to hide the nature of hazard-creating
enterprise. This could happen under any scheme
devised, but there would be a greater incentive to do
so under an injury tax scheme where the penalty is
directly related to a particular injury or disease".
A POLITICAL APPROACH
At best. the many proposals for improving hualth and
safety in the worklorce are not likely to lad to m1uch
improvernilt anid may, indued, be merely diver-
sionary Therefore, we ned a mi thaiiis to con-
vinc otUr hegisla turs that it is pernissiblhb to altl(;k
profitability of enteiprise where one of the: cobts of
profitability is thu physical well.beiig of the reml pro-
du ers and risk-takers in the workplact- - the
workers
What we need is an attention-getter My proposal
is that the serlousness and Ihe nature of the problm:rn
nay be deimonstrated by anwIloglcal r.-asoning If Il(
physi(c;a onslauiit which l ak.e, place in tlh
workplace occurr(d outside the employer employee
environment or. if you will, capitalist worker context.
there is no question but that society would use the
most formidable tool it has to stop the vicious attack
it would use the criminal proc(ess and treat the of-
fenders as heiOns social parialhs Pros(cuton1 of en-
treprenurs for the harn they do under the criminal
law proper, as opposed to safety and health
regulatory schernies, would characterize the conduct
(which we presently excuse on the basis of the mar-
ticulated economic premise that profit is God) for
what it really is an unjustifiable preference for
unregulated profit over the well-being of human be-
ings who are the most important contributors
towards the garnering of such profits.
That is, it we can pin-point entrepreneurial
behaviour which inflicts grievous bodily harm or
death as criminal conduct, then we will have
employed a means to reveal the nature of the social
entente we are supporting It is my belief that if this
can be done it will be possible to discuss the
necessary interference and regulation by govern-
mert in a much more direct way. It may even be true
that, within the context of a continuing capitalistic
mode of production, we can get to talk about what is
a reasonable profit in light of a more acceptable injury
and disease rate. No-one, except real Neanderthals.
will want to publicly adopt the posture that satisfying
greed is more important than the health and safety of
human beings.
The use of the criminal process has another attrac-
tion. Because law punishes behaviour which has
been adjudged unacceptable by society no matter
who the perpetrator of the offensive behaviour is, it
will be interesting to see how the administrators of
the legal justice system respond when it is argued
that entrepreneurs are offenders against the criminal
process in much the same way as robbers of private
property and assaulters of individual people for gain
or pleasure. It will be something of an insight - if it is
needed - it the officers of justice resist the applica-
tion of the criminal process in the kind of situations
that are posited in the following remarks. In and of
itself this will demonstrate the class bias of law as
well as the class bias of other forms of social
organization. This is a political point which may serve
a purpose in itself.
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AVAILABLE CRIMINAL OFFENCES
I do not claim to be a criminal law expert, certainly not
In respect of the Australian scene. I propose to iden-
tify the offences which are potentially useful to bring
home criminal responsibility to employers who im-
pose unbearable conditions on employees. It must
be remembered that the purpose of the exercise is
not to hang a few miscreants, but to focus attention
on the fact that outrageously dangerous practices
persist, thus pointing to the need for much more far-
reaching regulation than has taken place up to now
and even, perhaps, new planning in the enterprise
system of a kind which has never before taken place.
At the outset, note that In Canada criminal law has
been codifiedl e, but that the Code Is based solidly on
the common law notions which are the basis for
Australian criminal law. Inasmuch as the wording of
the Code seems to make for differences, it is usually
not so interpreted, the common law traditions prevail-
ing in the collective judicial mind.
(1) Murder: One of the real problems with this of-
fence, of course, is the proving of mens rea.
Nonetheless, given the way that the offence has
been defined, mens rea may be shown in some kinds
of cases. Section 212(b) of the Canadian Criminal
Code states that culpable homicide is murder -
(a) where the person who causes the death of a
human being...
(b) means to cause him bodily harm that he knows is
likely to cause his death, and is reckless whether
death ensues or not.
The difficulty here is obvious. Not only must an
employer mean to do bodily harm (which with some
ingenuity might be equated to knowingly doing bodily
harm, although Canadian authorities do not suggest
that this line of argument will be easily accepted),
there must also be subjective knowledge of probable
death as a consequence. This will be an almost insur-
mountable barrier, not the least because it may be
very difficult to show that - objectively - death is a
likely consequence of exposure of employees to
particular toxic substances.
In Australia, the same difficulties stand in the way
of successful murder charges. The law draws no
distinction between an Intention to kill and the
foresight by the accused of certainty that death will
ensue if certain conduct Is undertaken. Subjective
knowledge Is nonetheless required and, again, this
will be hard to prove where the relationship between
substances used in enterprise and the diseases
which cause death are still matters of some scientific
controversy. Nonetheless, murder is not to be
neglected as a potential head of criminal responsibili-
ty. The foresight which is necessary before it may be
equated with intention is, in fact, foresight of high
probability of death. Take a plant where asbestos Is
processed. Would it not be plausible to argue that
everyone knows that it has potentially lethal
qualities? If so, the basic political Issues will have to
be confronted by a court: If it Is held not to be murder
to have someone die as a result of exposure to
asbestos, the court must acknowledge that it has
made a judgment that the process involving the
known dangerous use of asbestos is, by reasoning
not applicable to the dangerous use of a motor car or
gun, not the kind of activity which attracts criminal
responsibility. Professor Howard, in his criminal law
text writes:
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Apart from the usual defences to a charge of murder,
there are some situations in which foresight of cer-
tainty that one's actions will cause the death of
another is not equivalent to intention to kill. For
example, D may be In charge of a dangerous con-
structional operation such as tunnelling through a
rock. It may be a statistical certainty that over a
period of one month at least one man in the number
under his command will be killed. D will nevertheless
not be guilty of murder if he knows the statistics and
orders the work to proceed. It is difficult to draw a
satisfactory distinction between cases where
foresight of certainty Is equivalent to intention In
murder and cases where It is not. The difference does
not lie in the Introduction of statistics, for these,
when used predictively, merely express a degree of
probability in a conveniently exact form. Neither does
the difference lie in the lawfulness of D's activity for,
apart from the homicide, a man lawfully blasting
holes in rock would be guilty of murder If he knew
that by setting off the charge he would certainly kill a
trespassing onlooker".
Although Professor Howard clearly thinks it too ob-
vious to state why it is that the tunnelling example
does not present a situation of murder, he leaves no
doubt as to what he believes. For our purposes it has
to be stated: in such a "useful" operation as tunnell-
ing through a rock, the certainty of death does not
make the risk which is deliberately run criminally un-
justifiable. That is, criminal law has built in it the no-
tion that some deliberate killing is permissible. This
raises our question: when is It justifiable to sacrifice
life to enterprise? To force that issue into open court
may have tremendous catalytic value.
In Canada, the possibility of raising that issue,
which I perceive to be the issue to bring to the public
fore, is aided by section 212(c) of the Criminal
Code. It provides that culpable homicide Is murder -
(c) where a person, for an unlawful object, does
anything that he knows or ought to know is likely to
cause death, and thereby causes death to a human
being, notwithstanding that he desired to effect his
object without causing death or bodily harm to any
human being.
The jurisprudence on this section is that there must
be an unlawful act leading to the death and that this
unlawful act is to have a separate unlawful object
over and above the causing of bodily harm or death.
Thus, on its face it would not be sufficient to say that
the act causing death, say, lack of provision for suffi-
cient ventilation, was unlawful because it was in
breach of a safety statute. Arguably, it could be said
that that breach of a statute had as its object a desire
to breach the common law duty that every master
owes to his servant to provide safe premises and
that, therefore, an unlawful act with an unlawful ob-
ject had been committed. This argument has logical
plausibility but it may be difficult to put it successfully
simply because it has never been used before.
Recent case law, however, has held that an
unlawful act, such as a breach of a statute or of the
common law duty owed by a master to his servant,
may have the unlawful objective of being a con-
spiracy if several people agreed to engage in the
unlawful act. It has further been held that if the
achievement or the attempted achievement of this
unlawful objective - conspiracy - led to death, murder
would have been committed. This is most promising
for my purposes, especially in view of the political
aim which I wish to further. If a case can be brought
Legal Service Bulletin
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on this basis it will Inevitably be essential for the pro-
secution to adduce evidence to the effect that the
reason for being in breach of the common law duty to
provide safe premises and working conditions Is to
make more money, regardless of the physical well-
being of the worker. Attention would thus be focus-
sed on the primary issue.
(2) Criminal Negligence: The following provisions
of the Canadian Criminal Code seem to be extremely
useful:
202.(1) Everyone is criminally negligent who-
(a) in doing anything, or
(b) in omitting to do anything that it Is his
duty to do, shows wanton reckless
disregard for the lives or safety
of other persons.
(2) For the purposes of this section "duty"
means a duty Imposed by law.
203. Everyone who by criminal negligence
causes death to another person Is guilty of an Indic-
table offence and is liable to imprisonment for life.
204. Everyone who by criminal negligence
causes bodily harm to another person is guilty of an
indictable offence and is liable to Imprisonment for
ten years.
Although it Is a fundamental principle of Canadian
criminal law that before one can be convicted of a
criminal offence, Including criminal negligence, the
prosecution must establish that the accused had the
requisite mens rea, it Is my reading of the case law on
criminal negligence that a conviction may be ob-
tainable if It can be shown that the conduct of the ac-
cused involved a risk whose likelihood of materializ-
Ing, and the gravity of harm which would ensue
should It materialize, cannot be justified as being a
reasonable risk to take. Once again, therefore, the
use of this offence would focus attention on the
justification for the running of risks in enterprise. Not
only is this politically satisfactory; there is, In fact,
hope for success. In a recent safety accident situa-
tion in Quebec a coroner actually recommended that
criminal negligence charges ought to be laid against
the employers. The facts were that the employer
knew that employees and inspectors were perturbed
by the lack of ventilation in some underground work.
When the workers were in fact overcome by
poisonous gases, the coroner was convinced that
the risk taken by the employer In Ignoring safety
precautions which they had been advised to take
was simply not justifiable.
It is my understanding that in Australia much of the
same argument would apply. I refer here to Howard's
criminal law text again"2. To illustrate his point
Howard uses the case of Lowe13. In that case the ac-
cused was In charge of bringing people In a mine up
to the surface by elevator. He delegated this task to
a boy who, he knew, did not understand the opera-
tion of the machinery. The ensuing deaths led to a
finding of manslaughter against the foreman. The
analysis used by the court was clear: where there is
a person who has a statutory duty to look after the
well-being of others, that person will be held criminal-
ly responsible for foreseeable harm arising out of a
dereliction of duty. Manslaughter will be found where
the accused takes an unjustifiable risk In view of the
likelihood of injury and the gravity of that injury. Sub-
jective intent, as it Is commonly defined, will not need
to be shown.
(3) Offences available under the Canadian
Criminal Code for which there may be no
Australian Equivalent:
201. Every master who
(a) unlawfully does, or causes to be done,
bodily harm to his apprentice or
servant so that his life Is endanger-
ed or his health is, or is likely to be
permanently Injured, ...
is guilty of an Indictable offence and is liable to Im-
prisonment for two years.
This section, on its face, is very useful. But It is an
assumption in the Criminal Code of Canada that
mens rea has to be established in respect of every
offence, whether or not It is expressly included. But,
of course, there are many shades of mens rea and it
may be plausible to raise an argument here. As far as
I know, no case has ever been brought under this
section.
380.(1) Everyone who wilfully breaks a contract,
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that
the probable consequences of doing so, whether
alone or in combination with others, will be -
(a) to endanger human life,
(b) to cause serious bodily injury,
is guilty of -
(f) an Indictable offence and Is liable to
imprisonment for five years, or
(g) an offence punishable on summary con-
viction.
Again, on its face, this promises a great deal, The dif-
ficulty with it is that 'wilful' has to be interpreted in the
mens rea sense. Again there has been no Interpreta-
tion that I know of, so there may be possibilities here.
This requires exploration.
(4) Conspiracy: Under the Canadian Criminal Code
the appropriate sections are sections 423(1)(d),
423(2). It is a conspiracy to wish to combine to com-
mit any of the offences already listed above or to
conspire with anyone to effect an unlawful purpose
or to effect a lawful purpose by unlawful means.
Clearly it will be a conspiracy to agree to commit an
act in breach of statute or to violate the contractual
provision requiring a safe system of work; and it may
even be arguable that to attempt to save money
(which is a lawful purpose) by breaching such
statutory or common law duties will also be a con-
spiracy. This, therefore, Is a most promising set of
provisions. It Is rather piquant to think that these sec-
tions might be usable, because conspiracy Is usually
used against accused people as a means whereby
the Crown can get convictions when actual proof of
offence by Individuals is hard to come by. I believe
the law is much the same in Australia.
SOME BASIC DIFFICULTIES WITH USING THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS
Time limits: In respect of potential charges for
murder it must be noted that death must occur within
one year and a day of the actus reus of the accused
having occurred. Exposure to toxic substances
sometimes leads .'o debilitation and eventual death
only many years after the original contact occurred.
There will be difficult questions as to the time from
which one starts counting the period of a year and a
day. Do note that, in this context, in criminal
negligence there is no need to establish that death




Causation: A problem that will raise its head, as it
does in all criminal and torts cases, is causation. In
theory it is no different here than it is in the civil law.
Thus, although the state of empirical knowledge may
be such that we cannot clearly establish a connec-
tion between the use of certain toxic substances and
particular diseases, this does not necessarily mean
that criminal charges cannot be successfully
brought. It seems to me that the arguments that are
used in torts cases in respect of causation will be ap-
plicable to criminal ones. I simply note that there are
many torts cases in which the use of toxic
substances leading to injury has been held to provide
a sufficient causal connection".
Criminal Responsibility of Corporations: Many of
the employers will be corporations. Is there a difficul-
ty about bringing criminal offences against corpora-
tions? As a matter of social policy there are concep-
tual difficulties. In particular, where subjective intent
is required to establish a criminal offence it is always
arguable that a corporation can have no such inten-
tion. Whatever may be the merits of this argument as
a matter of strict theory, it seems to be now unques-
tioned that corporations can be made liable for con-
duct which would lead to conviction in individuals. In
Canada, the Criminal Code provides specifically'"
that where corporations are held responsible for con-
duct which would lead to corporal punishment in
respect of an individual the corporation may be con-
victed and be saddled with a fine. In his text 6,
Howard writes that:
It may be thought that the natural limitations on the
power to punish a corporation Imply that there are
some crimes, notably offences against the person,
that a corporation cannot commit. There seems to be
no warrant for this. No theoretical reason suggests
Itself why, If It can be within the scope of a managing
director's employment to commit fraud in what he
supposes are the company's financial Interests, he
should not equally well be within the scope of the
employment to commit murder, or any other offence
against a person, with the same object. It is highly im-
probable that any good would come out of pro-
secuting the company, as opposed to the managing
director, and It Is clear that the usual punishment for
murder could not be imposed. These considerations,
however, have no logical bearing on the company's
criminal responsibility.
Discretion to Prosecute: The remaining major dif-
ficulty that I envisage is the fact that the forces of
prosecution would not be very keen to proceed to
trial with fact situations in which employers are being
sought to be made criminally responsible for the con-
duct of their enterprise. In Canada, it is possible for
individuals to lay private informations. In my view
academics are ideally placed to institute such pro-
ceedings. They can wait for the right fact situation to
be brought to them by willing unions and then,
without any risk to the particular unions or Individuals
Involved, lay the Information. It is still for Crown pro-
secutors to decide whether or not they will proceed
with the action. The Crown prosecutors may very
well refuse'". Should the official Crown prosecutor
refuse to take an action where the fact situation and
the theory of the law suggest that a crime has been
committed, this in itself will be politically useful
because It will have been made clear that the law is
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being applied in a lopsided manner to protect certain
kinds of entrepreneurs in situations where other
people would not get such protection. Indeed, it is
my purpose to show that, if the law were neutrally
applied, it is theoretically capable of being applied to
the enterprise-occupational health area.
FOOTNOTES
1. From Working Papers for a New Society (May/June 1978):
Boder and Wegman, "Increasing OSHA's Clout: Sixty
Million New Inspectors" -
Every year roughly 14,000 American workers are killed in on-
the-job accidents; more than two million are injured.
Fatalities from job-related illnesses are estimated (accurate
data is scarce) to run at 200.000 a year.
2. The most far-reaching agreement of this kind I know of is
that between UAW and Geiteral Motors in Ontario. There
are many variants, but remember that in this jurisdiction
only one-third of the people who work are unionized, and a
great percentage of those are in public-sector omployment
where risks are relatively low.
3. E.g., The Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act,
1977; An Act for the Promotion and Protection of the Health
and Safety of Persons Engaged in Occupations S.S. 1972,
c.86; The Workplace Safety and Health Act, S.M. 1976,
c.3; Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.11-1 (as am.
1976-77, c.27).
4. The Canadian statutes cited above embody such schemes,
but the most-tested and sophisticated one Is the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C., para. 851.
5. See T. Alexander, "OSHA's Ill-Conceived Crusade Against
Cancer" in Fortune, 3 July 1978, p.86.
6. This needs no documentation!
7. See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v Hodgson, 499
F. 2d 477-78 (D.C.C.A.); Florida Peach Growers'Associa-
tion v United States Department of Labor, 489 F. 2d 120.
130 (5th clrc. 1974).
8. A most spectacular Instance Is recorded by Randall
-"Worker Safety and Politics" - in the Washington Star,
15 July 1974: a letter by a Nixon aide to the Occupational
Health and Safety Agency containing the following was
reported:
No highly-controversial standards (that is cotton dust etc.) ...
be proposed by OSHA or NIOSHI (because of] the great
potential of OSHA as a sales point for fund-raising and
general support by employers.
And in the hearings before the Senate Select Committee
on Watergate, the then Undersecretary for Labor said that -
it would have been perfectly legitimate to say that OSHA
would more nearly balance the relative Interests of workers
and employers under a Republican than under a Democratic
Administration.
9. This argument Is more fully made In Working Papers etc.,
n. 1, above.
10. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.C-34.
11. Pi'stralian Criminal Law (2nd ed., 1970), pp.46-47.
12. pp.107 et seq; and also in the section "The Concept of
Awareness", pp.348 et seq.
13. (1850) 3 C.& K. 123.
14. Some well-known torts cases In which the causal connec-
tion between substance and injury was found to exist are
Bonnington Castings Ltd. v Wardlaw (19561 A.C. 613,
Nicholson v Atlas Steel Foundry and Engineering Co. Ltd.
(19571 1 W.L.R. 613, Smith v Central Asbestos Company;
Central Asbestos Co. Ltd. v Dodd 119721 2 All E.R. 1135;
McGhee v National Coal Board (197311 W.L.R. 1. Note that
finding that the causal connection exists may be easier for
courts In civil cases than in criminal ones, but that logically
this does not go to whether or not in fact there Is a causal
connection. The question of burden of proof on this point is
no different. The danger Is that the mens rea may be said




17. In Ontario, there is provision for prosecutions to be brought
by Special Crown prosocutors. The notion is that these
people will take on cases which otherwise might not be
pursued.
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